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DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY AND SELF-INCRIMINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal Bankruptcy Act' expressly provides that refusal by a bankrupt
in an insolvency proceeding to answer any material question approved by the
court is a ground for denial of discharge of the bankrupt's debts.2 Denials on
this ground have been upheld by numerous courts, even where the bankrupts'
refusals to answer have been based on the privilege against self-incrimination
guaranteed by the fifth amendment.3 However, certain recent Supreme Court
decisions, 4 concerning situations arguably analogous to that of the bankrupt
whose discharge is denied for a refusal to incriminate himself, have espoused
the doctrine that "the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the
Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly' "' amounts to an impermissable "penalty"
that would reduce the privilege "to a hollow mockery."0 Has Congress at-
tached such an unconstitutional penalty to a bankrupt's refusal to answer on
these grounds by denying a discharge from his debts? Examination into the
rationales of the Bankruptcy Act and the recent Court decisions which extend
the fifth amendment privilege suggests that Congress may have done so.
II. BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
The ancient concept of bankruptcy stems from Biblical times7 and Roman
law.8 The first English bankruptcy statute, to which American legislation on
1. The most recent comprehensive bankruptcy legislation is the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544-66. This Act has been substantially revised and amended by subsequent
legislation, notably by the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840-940. These Acts,
including all additions and amendments, are codified in 11 U.S.C. (1964).
2. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(6), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(6) (1964): "The court shall grant the
discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt has ... in the course of a proceeding under this
title refused . . . to answer any material question approved by the court . . . . " See 1
W. Collier, Bankruptcy f1 14.56 (14th ed. J. Moore & L. King 1968) [hereinafter cited as 1 W.
Collier].
3. E.g., In re Zaidins, 287 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'g 182 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Wis.
1960). Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949); In re Dresser, 146 F. 383 (2d
Cir. 1906). See 1 W. Collier f 14.58; C. Nadier, Bankruptcy § 758 (2d ed. S. Nadler & M.
Nadler 1965); 7 H. Remington, Bankruptcy § 3170 (6th ed. J. Henderson 1955) [herein-
after cited as 7 H. Remington]. The fifth amendment provides in part that "[n]o person
... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . . " U.S.
Const. amend. V.
4. E.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493
(1967).
5. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967) (citation omitted).
6. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557 (1956).
7. 1 H. Remington § 1, at 4 (5th ed. J. Henderson 1950) [hereinafter cited as 1 H.
Remington]: "The fifteenth chapter of Deuteronomy contains, quite explicitly stated, the
first law known in history providing for the release of debtors from their debts, and, were
the popular idea correct, the first bankruptcy law."
8. 1 H. Remington § 1, at 4-5; 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 1 (1963); 8 C.J.S. Bank-
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the subject may be traced,9 was enacted in 1542.10 This statute and its immediate
successors were enacted to facilitate creditor collections," and failed to differ in
their treatment of honest and dishonest debtors or to provide for their dis-
charge. 12 "The governing idea of the statutes was that the bankrupt is an
offender; and the fact that they provided for no discharge of the bankrupt
from his liabilities, as the result of bankruptcy proceedings, is characteristic of
this governing idea."'1 Moreover, English bankruptcy proceedings were avail-
able only to "traders," and then only when instituted by their creditors.' 4
The precarious status of seventeenth century English merchants, caused
by wars and unfriendly tariffs, prompted new bankruptcy legislation favoring
them.15 "The bankrupt had ceased to be regarded as necessarily a criminal."10
Parliament, finally recognizing that bankruptcies were inevitable in commercial
intercourse, and that they could be caused by economic phenomena beyond an
individual's control,'17 provided discharge in 17051s (although there is authority
that the purpose of this addition was merely to induce greater cooperation
from the bankrupt'9 ). However, English legislation in effect until after the
American Revolution was still restricted to involuntary proceedings brought
against merchants. 20
The United States Constitution expressly conferred upon Congress the power
to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."''1 Such legislation, first enacted in 1800,22 has remained sub-
stantially unchanged since the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,2 although notable
amendments and additions were provided by the Chandler Act of 1938.2 The
ruptcy § 2 (1962). The term "bankrupt" is derived from the Latin words "bancus" and
"ruptus" meaning broken table (the counters over which merchants transacted business
were broken as a symbol of failure). J. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 25, at 20 n.1 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as J. MacLachlan]; 8 C.J.S. Bankruptcy § 1, at 605 n.1 (1962). See
generally Levinthal, Early History of the Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. Pa. L. Rev. 223 (1918).
9. 1 H. Remington § 2-3; 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 2 (1963).
10. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542-43).
11. 8 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 236 (1926); J. MacLachlan § 26; C.
Nadler, supra note 3, at § 1; 1 H. Remington § 3; 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 3 (1963).
12. 8 XV. Holdsworth, supra note 11, at 243.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 244.
15. 11 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 444-45 (1938); 1 W. Blackstone,
Commentaries 807 (Andrews 4th ed. 1899).
16. 11 W. Holdsworth, supra note 15, at 445 (footnote omitted).
17. See authorities cited in note 15 supra.
18. 4 Anne, c. 17 (1705); see 11 W. Holdsworth, supra note 15, at 445; J. MacLachlan
§ 26; 1 H. Remington § 5.
19. . MacLachlan § 26.
20. J. MacLachlan § 27; 1 H. Remington § 6; 9 Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 3 (1963).
21. U.S. Const. art. I. § 8.
22. Act of April 4, 1800, ch. 9, § 1, 2 Stat. 19.
23. See note 1 supra.
24. Id.
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statute of 1800, like its English predecessors, proceeded upon the assumptions
that the debtor was dishonest and that bankruptcy was intended solely to
benefit creditors:
It followed in its main features and even in its wording the English bankruptcy laws,
and was essentially a law against debtors, framed along the lines of suppressing
fraudulent and criminal practices rather than along the lines of providing a general
system for the rational administration and equitable distribution of insolvent estates,
no provision at all being made for one voluntarily to become a bankrupt, the dis-
tinguishing feature of the later bankruptcy laws, without which a bankruptcy law
cannot be said to have arrived at the full stature of a general system of administering
insolvent estates. Indeed, like the laws that had gone before it in England, its
operation even adversarily was limited; only traders, merchants, underwriters and
brokers being within its purview. 25
Although discharge was provided in this statute, "it was necessary that two-
thirds of the creditors, in number and amount, (with claims of $50 or more),
who had proved their claims, consent to the discharge. "2  However, the second
bankruptcy act, enacted in 1841,27 permitted the debtor to bring voluntary
proceedings on his own behalf and "recognized ... the justice of granting to
the honest debtor . . . a discharge and release from his remaining debts-the
justice of lifting from his shoulders the burden of hopeless debt that otherwise
would have obliged him either to abandon all business enterprise or else to do
business under cover of another's name."128 Provisions for discharge continued
in the 1867 Act29 and were also included in our present-day law, the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.30 The bankrupt is now entitled to discharge "unless he has com-
mitted an offense punishable by imprisonment under the provisions of the
criminal code relating to bankruptcy, or unless he has disobeyed the bank-
ruptcy court or obtained credit on false financial statements, or failed in
certain other respects to maintain minimum standards safeguarding the integrity
of the proceedings."13'
The commentators appear to agree that the purposes of current bankruptcy
legislation are twofold: first, to secure an equitable division of the debtor's
assets and distribute them among his creditors; and, second, to provide for the
25. 1 H. Remington § 7, at 16 (footnote omitted).
26. 1 W. Collier ff 14.01[1], at 1246.
27. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440. See C. Warren, Bankruptcy in United States
History 69-87 (1935) for an excellent discussion of the congressional debates that culminated
in the enactment of the 1841 Act.
28. 1 H. Remington § 8, at 17-18.
29. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517; see 1 W. Collier 11 14.01(1], at 1247;
1. H. Remington § 9.
30. See note 1 supra. The present Bankruptcy Act provides: "'Discharge' shall mean the
release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such
as are excepted by this Act." Bankruptcy Act § 1(15), 11 U.S.C. § 1(15) (1964).
31. J. MacLachlan § 20, at 16 (footnote omitted). The Bankruptcy Act § 14c, 11
U.S.C. § 32(c) (1964), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(8) (Supp. III, 1968), contains
eight grounds for denial of a discharge.
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discharge of honest debtors.3 2 Even though discharge has historically been ac-
corded secondary status as a reason for bankruptcy, the fact that it may occupy
such a position should not depreciate its importance. Discharge was provided,
not solely to encourage cooperation by the debtor, but more importantly, "[t] he
whole philosophy of modern bankruptcy law recognizes that a debtor may
become a victim of economic or political or social conditions over which he
has no control." 33 Moreover, decisional law has at times accorded discharge the
primary role in bankruptcy legislation,34 thus leading to an inference that
twentieth century legislators have placed more emphasis on the needs of the
debtor than their creditor-oriented predecessors. Furthermore, socio-economic
considerations should not be ignored: "[B]ankruptcy [legislation's] . . .aim
is not merely release from the pressure of debt, but social and economic re-
habilitation as well. 35 It seems, then, that discharge has been transformed
into a fundamental principle of modern bankruptcy law. So important is dis-
charge that the present Act makes application for it automatic: "The adjudica-
tion of any person, except a corporation, shall operate as an application for a dis-
charge ...."36
According to the procedure of the present Act, after filing his petition for
bankruptcy, or after his creditors have done so, the bankrupt must prepare and
file with the court detailed schedules and include therein all his creditors, the
amount due them, as well as all his own assets.37 Thereafter a first meeting of
the creditors, over which the judge or referee presides, is held. 38 At this meeting
the bankrupt is examined regarding his schedules,9 and it is here, for instance,
that the bankrupt's discharge may be denied under the grounds established by
section 14c(6) 4o--for refusal to answer a material question, even though the
bankrupt asserts his privilege against self-incrimination as the basis for his
refusal to answer.41 In addition, the court may be confronted with the assertion
of the bankrupt's fifth amendment privilege at a subsequent meeting of the
32. J. MacLachlan §§ 20-21; C. Nadler, supra note 3, § 729; 1 H. Remington § 17;
see I W. Collier ff 14.01[6], at 1259.
33. C. Nadler, supra note 3, § 2; see 7 H. Remington § 2993.
34. See 1 H. Remington § 17, citing Hardie v. Swafford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 165 F.
588 (5th Cir. 1908); 1 W. Collier 14.01[6], at 126 n.42, citing Shelby v. Texas Improve-
ment Loan Co., 280 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1960), and In re Rinker, 107 F. Supp. 261 (D.N.M.
1952).
35. 1. H. Remington § 17, at 37-38, citing Bank of Elberton v. Swift, 268 F. 305 (5th
Cir. 1920): "Congress enacted the bankruptcy statute in the exercise of a public policy, for
the benefit, not of debtors and creditors, but of society at large." 268 F. at 308.
36. Bankruptcy Act § 14a, 11 US.C. § 32(a) (1964). Before 1938, individuals as well as
corporations had to make separate application for a discharge. 7 H. Remington § 2995, at 45.
37. Bankruptcy Act § 7a(g)-(9), 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(8)-(9) (1964).
38. Id. § 55, 11 U.S.C. § 91 (1964).
39. Id. §§ 7a(1), 10, 55b, 11 U-S.C. §§ 25(a)(1), 28, 91(b) (1964).
40. See note 2 supra.
41. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
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creditors, at a hearing upon objections to his discharge, 42 or at any other
proceedings calling for the cooperation of the debtor.48
III. SELF-INCRIMINATION: PAST AND PURPOSES
The privilege against self-incrimination was the product of two distinct, yet
parallel, strains of jurisprudence running through English history from the
thirteenth century.44 On the one hand there originated "the opposition to the
ex officio oath of the ecclesiastical courts," 45 and, on the other, there developed
"the opposition to the incriminating question in the common law courts. ' ' 4 0
Such oppositions culminated in a common law recognition of the privilege
against self-incrimination.47 In England the privilege remained a mere segment
of the common law, but in America it was elevated to a constitutional standard
through its inclusion in seven state constitutions before 1789.48 This nation's
first Congress in that year found the need for such a privilege compelling
enough to include in the Bill of Rights that "[n] o person.., shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... -49
The purported meaning and scope of the privilege is clearly one of the most
controversial issues of modern constitutional jurisprudence. o Although the word-
42. See Bankruptcy Act § 14b, 11 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1964), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32(b)
(Supp. II1, 1968).
43. Bankruptcy Act § 7a, 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (1964), providing the duties of the bankrupt,
illustrates numerous situations in which the bankrupt may be called upon to cooperate.
44. 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2250, at 269-70 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [herein-
after cited as J. Wigmorel.
45. Id. at 269 (emphasis omitted). The "ex officio" oath was a procedure first employed
in the ecclesiastical courts in 1236 by which a party was required to tell the truth when
confronted by questions posed by the court under threat of punishment by torture. C.
McCormick, Evidence § 120, at 252-53 (1954) [hereinafter cited as C. McCormick]; J.
Wigmore § 2250, at 270-71. However, there was authority that at least a specific accusation
must have been first made against the accused or that the judge must have demonstrated
"notorious suspicion" regarding the individual's activties. Thus the maxim evolved that
"[n]o man shall be compelled to make the first charge against himself." C. McCormick
§ 120, at 253 (emphasis omitted). Opposition to this oath culminated in Lilburn's Trial
(1637-45) which resulted in the passage by Parliament of legislation abolishing the oaths
administered by the ecclesiastical courts. C. McCormick § 120, at 254; J. Wigmore § 2250,
at 282-84.
46. J. Wigmore § 2250, at 269 (emphasis omitted). That no privilege against self-incrimi-
nation existed at common law prior to Lilburn's Trial is uncontested. However, after that
event and the abolition of the "ex officio" oath in the eccelesiastical courts, the defendants'
claim of the privilege came to be gradually recognized by the common law judges. C.
McCormick § 120, at 254-55; J. Wigmore § 2250, at 289-90. This privilege has never been
included in any English charters or statutes. C. McCormick § 120, at 255; J. Wigmore
§ 2250, at 292.
47. See note 46 supra.
48. C. McCormick § 120, at 256. See generally Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763 (1935).
49. U.S. Const. amend. V.
50. "There is no agreement as to the policy of the privilege against self-incrimination.
[Vol. 37
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ing of the fifth amendment applies the privilege only to criminal proceedings,
the Supreme Court has extended the protection "to all judicial or official hear-
ings, investigations or inquiries where persons are called upon formally to
give testimony." 51 Although all of these states except Iowa and New Jersey
have constitutional language providing for a privilege similar to that found
in the federal Bill of Rights,5 2 it was not until 1964 that the federal provision
was made applicable to the states.rm Generally the privilege has been sustained
on grounds of protection to the individual against torture, compulsion and
invasion of privacy.-4 Opponents of the privilege have argued, however, that
only the guilty benefit and that it is counter to any rational system of investiga-
tion.55
Recently, self-incrimination has undergone revolutionary development by the
Supreme Court. In Malloy v. Hogan,"0 the Court, reasoning that the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause had incorporated the privilege against self-
incrimination found in the fifth amendment, held the privilege binding on the
states.57 Consequently the federal standard for determining whether a refusal to
This is partly because there is no 'the' privilege. It is many things in as many settings. The
privilege is a prerogative of a defendant not to take the stand in his own prosecution; it is
also an option of a witness not to disclose self-incriminating knowledge in a criminal case,
and in a civil case, and before a grand jury and legislative committee and administrative
tribunal. It is alleged by some to apply to suppress substances removed from the body, to
confessions and to facts tending to disgrace. It is sometimes held to apply beyond incrimina-
tion under domestic law to incrimination under foreign law. Suggestions as to the policy of
'the' privilege are lurking in all these settings and more." J. Wigmore § 2251, at 296-97
(citations omitted).
51. C. McCormick § 123, at 259 (citation omitted) ; see, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155 (1955); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See generally J. Wigmore
§ 2252.
52. J. Wigmore § 2252, at 319 & n.1.
53. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964).
54. J. Wigmore § 22S1, at 315-18. Other arguments in favor of the privilege include
danger of blackmail, subjection of the accused to perjury, and the need for independent
investigation. C. McCormick § 136, at 288-90. See the extended discussion of authorities
in J. Wigmore § 2251, at 297 n.2; cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which
recognized a constitutional right of privacy.
55. J. Wigmore § 2251, at 297 n.2; see Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937): "Justice, however, would not perish if the accused
were subject to a duty to respond to orderly inquiry."
56. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
57. Id. at 8. Previous authority had held that this provision was not applicable to the
states. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). Malloy is in line with the present court practice
of "selective incorporation", that is, deciding on a case-by-case basis whether or not a
specific provision of the Bill of Rights shall be included in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, and thus made applicable to the states. See, eg., Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to trial by jury); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643
(1961) (fourth amendment right against unreasonable search and siezure). The Court has
19691
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answer was justified on self-incriminatory grounds became applicable to state
proceedings, wherein consideration would henceforth have to be given to the
question, in the Court's words, whether "'a responsive answer to the question
or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because
injurious disclosure could result.' ,58 " 'The privilege afforded not only extends
to answers that would in themselves support a conviction ... but likewise em-
braces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute . . .' "59 Subsequently, in Griffin v. Calijornia,0° where the petitioner
had been convicted of murder following a trial during which the prosecution
had commented upon his failure to testify, the Court reversed the conviction,
citing Malloy for the proposition that federal standards governing the privilege
against self-incrimination were binding on the states. Applying such standards
the Court stated: "[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws.
It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutonal privilege. It
cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly."'" This key concept of
"penalty," mentioned in Griffin, has become the core rationale of subsequent
cases in which the Court has tried to delineate a federal standard.
Garrity v. New Jersey62 involved the convictions of the state police officers
for conspiracy. The officers had been called before a special state commission
investigating the "fixing" of traffic tickets. When questioned, they were
threatened that if they refused to answer they would be subject to removal from
office. The officers testified and their statements were subsequently used as a
basis for their criminal convictions. In reversing, the Court stated that "[t]he
choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate them-
selves. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of
self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain
silent." 63 More generally, the Court found that "[t]here are rights of con-
stitutional stature whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of
a price.0 4
In Spevack v. Klein,65 decided the same day as Garrity, it appeared that
petitioner, a member of the bar, refused to produce certain records or to testify
before a judicial inquiry into alleged "ambulance-chasing" on grounds that to
rejected the "total incorporation" doctrine found in, e.g., Adamson v. California, supra, at 68
(dissenting opinion), that the due process clause includes all of the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights.
58. 378 U.S. at 12 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
60. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
61. Id. at 614 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
62. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
63. Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 500 (emphasis added). In effect the Court found the statements were the
product of coercion, and were thus not "voluntary." Id. at 497-98; cf. Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964). Furthermore, the Court failed to find any waiver of the officers' rights,
since their decision was made under duress. 385 U.S. at 498-99.
65. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
[Vol. 37
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do so would violate his privilege against self-incrimination. The New York
courts ordered petitioner disbarred on the basis of Cohen v. Hurley,0 a decision
which had denied the assertion of the privilege on nearly identical facts. The
Supreme Court in Spevack, again relying on Malloy v. Hogan] overruled
Cohen. The New York appellate division had distinguished Malloy on the
ground that no lawyer was involved in that case.08 But the Supreme Court
said: "[W] e conclude that . . . the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection
to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered
down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a liveli-
hood as a price for asserting it."09 The New York Court of Appeals had affirmed
petitioner's disbarment not only on the authority of Cohen, but also on the
premise that the privilege had no application to written records which peti-
tioner had been held under a duty to produce.70 However, the Court found that
petitioner was under no such duty because the documents demanded were his
financial records and could not be termed "the pleadings, records and other
papers" required to be retained by New York law.7 ' The Court also dwelled,
as it had in Garrity, on the coercion inherent in the facts of the case: "The
threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputa-
tion, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer
relinquish the privilege."17 2
What is the substance of this coercive penalty or price that the Court has
so often noted? "'Penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment. It means
... the imposition of any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege 'costly.' ,7 It is not explicitly clear from this statement in
Spevack, or the statements in any other decision, what this penalty involves.
The Court does point out, however, in both cases, the "coercion" and "compul-
sion" inherent in any procedure which forces the individual to testify rather
than forfeit a substantial pecuniary benefit, e.g., employment and the means
of livelihood 4 Can failure to allow discharge in bankruptcy amount to such
a penalty?
IV. THE RELATION OF SELF-INCRIMINATION TO BANKRUPTCY
A. Effect of Section 7a(10): Use of Bankrupt's Testimony
in a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding
The Bankruptcy Act provides in section 7a(10) that:
The bankrupt shall . . . at the first meeting of his creditors, at the hearing upon
objections, if any, to his discharge and at such other times as the court shall order,
66. 366 US. 117 (1961).
67. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
68. 385 U.S. at 514.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at n.1.
71. Id. at 515-19.
72. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). See note 64 supra.
73. 385 U.S. at 515.
74. See notes 64 & 72 and accompanying text supra.
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submit to an examination concerning the conducting of his business, the cause of his
bankruptcy, his dealings with his creditors and other persons, the amount, kind, and
whereabouts of his property, and, in addition, all matters which may affect the
administration and settlement of his estate or the granting of his discharge; but no
testimony given by him shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal
proceeding, except such testimony as may be given by him in the hearing upon ob-
jections to his discharge .... 75
A literal interpretation of section 7a(10) suggests that a bankrupt would have
no need, and more importantly, no right to claim his privilege against self-
incrimination, unless he testifies at a "hearing upon objections to his discharge"
which is governed by the "except" clause, because adequate immunity obviates
the possibility of incrimination. 76 "This is so when the witness has already been
convicted or acquitted of the offense, when he has been pardoned, or when
prosecution has been barred by the statute of limitations."77 However, in order
for the danger of prosecution to be removed, complete immunity from prosecu-
tion must be provided. 78 The language of section 7a(10) merely provides that
the relevant testimony will be immune from use, but omits any reference to
immunity from prosecution.79 Thus, although the actual testimony of the bank-
rupt, except that given by him in a hearing upon objection to his discharge, is
inadmissable in a subsequent criminal action, there is no guarantee that he will
not be prosecuted for a crime he may reveal by his testimony. Apparently, there-
fore, the bankrupt is not afforded protection coextensive with that furnished by
the privilege against self-incrimination. Accepting this conclusion, the decisions
have upheld his right to claim the privilege, in spite of the protection afforded
by 7a(10).80
75. Bankruptcy Act § 7a(10), 11 U.S.C. § 25(a)(10) (1964) (emphasis added). See 1
W. Collier ff 7.21.
76. See C. McCormick § 135; J. Wigmore §§ 2279-84.
77. C. McCormick § 135, at 284 (footnotes omitted).
78. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See C. McCormick § 135; J. Wlgmore
§ 2283. The federal immunity act is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1964), as amended,
18 U.S.C. § 3468 (Supp. III, 1968). See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) and
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) for cases upholding immunity statutes as non-viola-
tive of the Constitution. Note, however, that a witness may not be forced to testify under
a state grant of immunity when he has not been accorded immunity under federal law.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). See J. Wigmore § 2281, at 495 n.11 for
an extensive list of state immunity statutes.
79. Wigmore distinguishes between "immunity-from-use" and "immunity-from-prosecu-
tion" statutes. The former "provide ... that self-incriminating disclosures may be compelled
but that the testimony shall not afterwards be used against the witness In any judicial
proceeding." J. Wigmore § 2281, at 495 n.11 (emphasis omitted). The latter "provide that
disclosure is compellable but that the witness shall not be prosecuted or subject to any pen-
alty on account of any matter concerning which he was required to produce evidence." Id.
Wigmore categorizes § 7a(10) as an "immunity-from-use" statute. Id.
80. In Counseiman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Court construed a similarly
worded statute as failing to nullify petitioner's right to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination because the statute was found to be not as broad in scope as the fifth amend-
1969] DISCHARGE AND SELF-INCRIMINATION 459
Further, whatever limited protection may be given by 7a(10), such protection
is restricted to "testimony" and "[ilt is well settled that the restriction ...
pertains only to oral testimony and does not prevent the introduction of the
bankrupt's written schedules [in a subsequent criminal proceeding]."81 It does
not forbid the bankrupt from asserting his privilege against self-incrimination
by refusing to introduce written material. Nevertheless, to what extent does the
privilege apply? Although written documents do not constitute "testimony"
for purposes of section 7a(10), 8 2 "testimonial compulsion" within the meaning
of the privilege includes "the production of documents or chattels by a person
... in response to a subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other
form of process relying on his moral responsibility for truthteltg .... " At
least the last quoted phrase would seem to make the privilege applicable to
written documents and schedules required of the bankrupt by the courL How-
ever, the courts have not yet permitted a bankrupt to file bank schedules under
invocation of the privilege, holding "that the privilege should be asserted against
a specific question, not toward the schedules as a whole . . ... " In addition,
ment privilege. Although the statute in that case protected the petitioner from the "use"
of his testimony in a criminal proceeding against him, as does § 7a(10) of the Bankruptcy
Act, the Court recognized the leads or connections to other evidence which might be un-
covered. Id. at 585. Petitioner could not be forced to testify, or punished for his failure to
do so unless Congress were to "afford absolute immunity against future prosecution . . . "
Id. at 586. Brown v. Walker, 161 US. 591 (1896) involved a statute that did provide com-
plete immunity and the Court refused to reverse a contempt conviction for failure to answer.
Relying on the authority of Counselman, a bankruptcy court in In re Scott, 9S F. 815
(WI). Pa. 1899) construed § 7a(10) as failing to provide complete "immunity from prose-
cution" and upheld the bankrupt's right to remain silent. In United States v. Goldstein, 132
F. 789 (WI). Va. 1904) another court refused to accept the contention that the filing of a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy amounted to a waiver of defendant's constitutional privi-
lege and recognized that the condition upon which he could claim the privilege was denial
of discharge. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) arose out of a refusal to testify
in an examination conducted by a bankruptcy court. The Court stated that the privilege
"applies alike to dvil and criminal proceedings" and upheld the right of the bankrupt to
refuse to testify. 266 U.S. at 40. A contrary result was reached in Johnson v. United States, 228
U.S. 457 (1913), where the Court held that a bankrupt could not refuse to surrender books
and records to a trustee, for to do so would contravene a property right vested in the
trustee. The McCarthy Court distinguished the Johnson decision by noting that the consti-
tutional privilege dealt solely with the procedural law, which included evidence and wit-
nesses. 266 U.S. at 41-42. See 1 W. Collier II 7.21, at 1013 n.1 for a complete set of citations.
But see Mackel v. Rochester, 102 F. 314 (9th Cir. 1900).
81. 1 W. Collier, fI 7.13, at 996.
82. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
83. J. Wigmore § 2264, at 379 (emphasis omitted).
84. Moller, The Bankrupt and the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 10 S. Tex. L.J. 75, 81
(1968), explaining the rationale of In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F2d 622 (3d Cir.
1967). However, the author argues that in light of Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968), and Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.. 39 (1968), "the Bankruptcy Court would
be compelled to accept a blank schedule" should the questions form a "'link in the
chain of evidence?" Moller, supra, at 81.
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the right of the bankrupt to claim the privilege in regard to his own books and
records kept as part of his business operation has not been sustained on the
theory that a refusal to deliver them to a receiver or a trustee would violate the
latter's property right in the material 95 Since the decisions concerning written
testimony appear incompatible with the privilege against self-incrimination, they
are in need of re-examination. 6
Finally, it should be pointed out that the protection afforded by 7a(10) is
inapplicable to testimony furnished by the bankrupt in a hearing upon objec-
tions to his discharge. Since it is natural that the privilege is most frequently
asserted in such hearings, there is not even available the limited protection of
7a(10) for that portion of the testimony which is most likely to be incriminating.
B. Refusal of Discharge under Section 14c(6)
The Bankruptcy Act provides, in section 14c(6), for the denial of discharge
in bankruptcy proceedings when the debtor refuses to answer a material question
approved by the court.87 That a bankrupt failed to answer on the ground that
the reply might incriminate him has been held to be no defense to this provi-
sion. 8  Although the bankrupt is, of course, free to assert the privilege and can
not be held in contempt for so doing,89 the inevitable result is denial of dis-
charge under section 14c(6).90 In upholding this result, where a bankrupt claims
the privilege against self-incrimination, the courts have placed a restrictive in-
terpretation on the term "discharge" by labeling it a privilege9' to which Con-
85. Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147 (1923) ; Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913) ;
see 1 W. Collier ff 7.21, at 1021-22; note 80 supra. But see Moller, supra note 84, at 88-91.
86. See the criticisms of Moller, supra note 84, at 81, 90-91.
87. See note 2 and accompanying text supra. Note that discharge cannot be denied If
the bankrupt refused to answer an immaterial question, In re Lenweaver, 226 F. 987 (N.D.
N.Y. 1915), or if the court failed to approve the material question. In re Kolb, 151 F.2d
605 (2d Cir. 1945). Once the bankrupt's objections to a refusal to answer are overruled,
however, he must answer. In re Weinreb, 153 F. 363 (2d Cir. 1907). Also, even though the
bankrupt subsequently answers after a first refusal to do so, he may be denied his discharge.
In re Schwartz & Co., 201 F. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1912). See generally I W. Collier UI 14.58, at
1430-32.
88. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
89. See text section IV A and accompanying footnotes supra.
90. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
91. "[lIt is within the power of Congress to grant or to refuse a discharge to a bankrupt
upon such conditions as it may deem proper. Such a privilege is not a natural right, or a
right of property, but is a matter of favor, to be accepted upon such terms as Congress
sees fit to impose." In re Dresser, 146 F. 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1906). Discharge was also denied
on grounds that the bankrupt had obtained credit through a fraudulent statement forbidden
by the Act in § 14c(3), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(3) (1964), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(8)
(Supp. III, 1968). See In re Nachman, 114 F. 995, 997 (D.S.C. 1902), decided before the
inclusion in 1903 of § 14c(6) in the Act, which stated in dictum that Congress had the
power to enact such a provision; Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210, 211 (4th Cir. 1949) ;
In re Zaidins, 182 F. Supp. 543, 545 (ED. Wis. 1960), aff'd, 287 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1961);
In re Bauknight, 14 F.2d 674 (S.D. Fla. 1926); In re Williams, 286 F. 135, 137 (W.D.S.C.
1921) (report of special comm'r). "[Wlhatever the formal trappings in which the Issue of
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gress can attach conditions as it sees fit, namely, those requiring full disclosure.
In this regard, courts have failed to recognize discharge as a fundamental policy
consideration of the Bankruptcy Act, disregarding the fact that modem bank-
ruptcy legislation is motivated not solely by advantages that may be accorded
creditors, but also by the interest of debtors and society at large.02
C. Effect of Spevack and Garrity on Section 14c(6)
As previously mentioned,93 the penalty forbidden to be placed on the asser-
tion of an individual's fifth amendment privilege includes "the imposition of any
sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege 'costly."'
"In this context 'penalty' is not restricted to fine or imprisonment."0 5 Applying
this sweeping language from Spevack, it appears that section 14c(6) may effect
an impermissable penalty. Whenever a court asks a bankrupt a question, the
answer to which will incriminate him under bankruptcy law,00 the bankrupt will
lose his discharge whether he answers or not,97 even if his silence follows an in-
vocation of the privilege. To so sanction him with a denial of discharge when he
asserts the privilege is to place an onerous penalty upon the assertion of his
privilege.
The decisions that have labeled discharge a "mere privilege" have apparently
proceeded upon the antiquated assumption that bankruptcy legislation was en-
acted solely for the benefit of creditors.9s They have disregarded the fact that
bankruptcy, and in particular, discharge, was also intended to benefit the bank-
rupt himself, as well as society at large. These courts have also disregarded "the
discharge may be presented, many strict decisions best consist with the underlying concept
that a discharge is a statutory privilege to be enjoyed only upon compliance with the
statute . . . 2" J. MfacLachlan § 101, at 89-89. But see C. Nadler, supra note 3, § 730,
at 602 (footnotes omitted): "Some courts consider it a privilege, while other courts hold it a
right, for a bankrupt to be granted a discharge." The use of the word "privilege" in
connection with § 14c(6) should not be confused with the use of that same word in refer-
ring to the privilege against self-incrimination. In the former context, "privilege" is used
in contrast to the term "right," while in the latter situation, the word "privilege" is em-
ployed because of its historical derivation as such before it was enacted into a constitutional
right appearing in the fifth amendment.
92. See text section II and accompanying footnotes supra.
93. See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
94. 385 U.S. at 515; see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); notes 60-61 and
accompanying text supra.
95. 385 U.S. at 515.
96. Bankruptcy Act § 14c(I)-(4), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(1)-(4) (1964), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 32(c) (1)-(4) (Supp. I1, 1968).
97. A bankrupt can refuse to answer, in which case his discharge will be denied under
§ 14c(6), or he can answer and reveal his criminal activities. In the latter situation, not
only will the bankrupt leave himself open to subsequent criminal prosecution, but in addi-
tion his discharge may still be denied since § 14c also provides that certain conduct, for
example, failure to keep financial records, concealing property, or fraudulent transfers, may
also be grounds for denial of a discharge. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
98. See the discussion in section II supra.
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significant provision which has persisted in the statute that the discharge, unless
it is proved to be barred, 'shall' be granted."09 Thus, the very language of
section 14c states that the bankrupt is entitled to a discharge, unless certain
objections are proven, leading to the conclusion that "[d]ischarge is a legal
right . . . ."loo The wording of the statute is mandatory, compelling the court
to grant a discharge unless the objections are proven. Such language is clearly
inconsistent with the term "privilege," which connotes mere judicial and legis-
lative favor.
Obviously no bankrupt has a constitutional right to discharge, for he possesses
merely a statutory right found in the Bankruptcy Act. By the same token, no
one has any right guaranteed by the Constitution to enjoy the status of a par-
ticular occupation, such as lawyer or policeman. 10 1 As Justice Holmes stated in
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford:1° 2 "The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man."'' 3 The decisions prior to Garrity and Spevack allowed employment in the
public sector to be conditioned upon terms dictated by the governmental em-
ployer, notably the surrender of certain constitutional guarantees as the price
of employment. 0 4 In this regard the public employment decisions proceeded
analogously to those concerning bankruptcy discharge. They labeled public
employment a "privilege" bestowed as the employer saw fit.' °0  However, the
Court in Garrity "rejected the Holmes 'right-privilege' distinction as inappro-
priate in consideration of the constitutional question before the court." 00 Thus,
the Court bypassed the distinction between privilege and right and held the
99. 7 H. Remington § 2993, at 44 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at n.7, citing In re Farrow, 28 F. Supp. 9. (S.D. Cal. 1939); C. Nadler, supra
note 3, § 730, at 602-03: "It would seem from the fact that this provision [§ 14c] has been
so recast in the present Act, it was the legislative intent to create a statutory right . . . .
(footnotes omitted) ; see cases cited by C. Nadler, supra, at n.8.
101. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517; see King, Constitutional Rights and the Bankruptcy
Act, 72 Com. L.J. 315, 316 (1967); Moller, supra note 84, at 84-85. But see Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
1439 (1968): "While the concept of 'privilege' underlying Holmes' epigram remains nomin-
ally intact, its implications for positive law have been gradually eroded." Id. at 1442. "If,
under a functional analysis, the conclusion reached by Justice Holmes in 1892 is no longer
viable, then Holmes' own methodology should be used to label an individual's interest In
his public status a 'right' directly protected against unreasonable regulation. Such unreason-
ableness need involve only the lack of a sufficient connection with an adequately compell-
ing public interest to warrant subordinating the individual interest under the circumstances."
Id. at 1462. See also Comment, Constitutionality of Administrative or Statutory Sanctions
upon the Exercise of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 593
(1968).
104. See cases cited in Comment, supra note 103, at 597 n.45.
105. See text at Section IV B and accompanying footnotes supra.
106. Weistart, The Interaction of Constitutional Privilege and Statutory Immunity In
Bankruptcy Examinations, 53 Minn. L. Rev. 29, 51 (1968), citing 385 U.S. at 499.
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conditions imposed in Garrity and Spevack to have been unconstitutional penal-
ties. Analogously, should discharge still be deemed a privilege, as public employ-
ment was in Garrity and Spevack, this consideration should no longer afford a
justification for a denial of discharge when a bankrupt raises his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination in refusing to answer.
Indeed, in Garrity, and to some extent in Spevack, there was an element lend-
ing strength to the position which the Court refused to take; this element is
probably lacking in the case of the bankrupt whose assertion of the privilege
costs him discharge. The Court characterized Spevack as a licensee of the state
and an officer of the court,10 7 though it refused to deem him an "agent" of the
state.'08 While it is arguable whether such status made him a fiduciary' 00 of the
state, Garrity as a policeman clearly assumed a fiduciary relationship to that
body. However, it is questionable whether a bankrupt may be deemed a fiduci-
ary to the state, or to his creditors, trustee or receiver, despite the disclosure
standards of section 7.110 While the existence of a fiduciary duty of course makes
more reasonable some sanction upon use of the privilege, the Garrity Court re-
fused to find assertion of the privilege violative of that duty, thus suggesting
that a bankrupt, whose fiduciary duty, if any, may be weaker in quality than
that found in Garrity, should possess more right to claim the privilege. While
a denial of discharge does not threaten a bankrupt with forfeiture of any par-
ticular status (e.g., policeman or lawyer), he is faced with similar economic loss
if he asserts his privilege. Without a discharge of his obligations, the bankrupt
may never gain a status more fundamental than vocational status: the oppor-
tunity to retain the assets he may subsequently acquire.'
It can be argued that in filing a voluntary petition a bankrupt submits him-
self to the conditions that Congress may impose upon discharge, irrespective of
such rights. This argument lacks persuasion, however, when it is contrasted to
the involuntary proceeding, wherein the bankrupt has not surrendered his assets
by his own choice. That the right to claim a constitutional guarantee should
turn on whether or not the bankrupt has initiated the proceedings is an un-
realistic assumption leading to a dual standard," 2 particularly since " ' [ t] he
privilege is not waived by filing a voluntary petition, nor by filing sworn sched-
ules of assets and liabilities.' ,13
V. CONCLUSION
Disallowance of discharge in bankruptcy for failure to answer a material ques-
tion is an impermissable "penalty" forbidden by the rationale of Spevack and
107. 385 U.S. at 520 (Fortas, J. concurring). But see Underwood, The Fifth Amendment
and the Lawyer, 62 Nw. U.L. Rev. 129, 131 (1967).
108. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958).
109. Id. at § 13: "An agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of
his agency." See id. at comment a.
110. Bankruptcy Act § 7, 11 US.C. § 25 (1964).
111. See King, supra note 103, at 316; Moller, supra note 84, at 85.
112. See King, supra note 103, at 316.
113. Id. at n.15; see 1 W. Collier 1 7.21, at 1015.
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Garrity when the bankrupt asserts his right against self-incrimination as the
reason for his refusal to answer. It is a "costly sanction" for the assertion of
a constitutional guarantee, the invocation of which may not be contravened by
conditions imposed on its exercise. Should Congress feel that full disclosure is
inherently necessary for the administration of the bankrupt's estate, it should
grant complete immunity to the bankrupt from criminal prosecution for any
relevant crime that he may disclose, thus denying him the opportunity to raise
self-incrimination.11 4 The immunized bankrupt who still refuses might be com-
pelled to testify3' 5 However, as the law now stands, the bankrupt's privilege
against self-incrimination is severely impaired by the exaction of a "price" for
its assertion.
114. This could easily be effected by according the bankrupt "immunity from prosecu-
tion" in § 7a(10) for any crimes he may reveal, including any disclosed at a hearing upon
objection to his discharge. See Section IV A and accompanying footnotes supra.
115. See note 77 supra.
